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As a subject of extensive scholarship and a potent political buzzword, 
globalization is a deeply polarizing concept that inspires conflicting views about its 
effects.  In the United States, popular debate often describes globalization as having 
uniformly positive or negative impacts on the country’s economic health. This line of 
reasoning is employed particularly with respect to shifts in the labor market and its 
implications on Americans’ economic prosperity. This reasoning, however, is not a 
theoretically sound or an empirically useful way to describe and understand the 
economic impact of globalization, for it implies that a complex, multifaceted 
phenomenon produces uniform results (whether positive or negative) and neglects 
consideration of factors that mediate the impact of globalization.  This binary 
approach, moreover, leads to highly simplified explanations of the current social, 
economic and political divisions in the United States. 
To address these problems, this thesis first reframes the conventional binary 
approach to globalization to argue that the impact of globalization is mediated by the 
variations in the economic contexts of American states.  To validate my revised 
approach, I present and analyze data on the impact of globalization with respect to the 
inward foreign-direct investment (FDI) on employment Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and 
Texas.  I then elaborate on the implications of this analysis by discussing how it helps 
a more nuanced understanding of the current political and economic discontent in the 
United States.  
The thesis is divided into 5 sections. In section 1, I critique the theoretical 
underpinnings of the popular debate surrounding the effects of globalization, and 
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propose an alternative theory. In section 2, I describe the data used to advance my 
argument and outline the methodology I applied to gauge the impact of globalization 
on the four states examined in the thesis. Section 3 contains my data analysis, where I 
describe the sectoral employment profile of each of the four states, then discuss the 
significance of foreign direct investment with respect to employment across 7 key 
economic sectors across the four states, placing heavy emphasis on the manufacturing 
sector. In section 4, I discuss at length the broader implications of the data, illustrating 
how the varied impact of foreign direct investment can explain much of the current 
political and economic discontent in the United States. Section 5 briefly summarizes 
the key findings from the data and its broader implications. 
II. Theory 
In his book Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Globalization in the 
Era of Trump, Joseph Stiglitz notes that “honest academics have always pointed out 
that there would be winners and losers in globalization” (Stigliz 2017). Indeed, 
globalization scholarship thoroughly acknowledges the “uneven, differential, and 
dynamic” effects of globalization and its associated processes (Gumez 2017). In his 
seminal work The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman advances the argument 
that globalization produces “lions” at the apex of the global economic order that prey 
upon “wounded gazelles,” who lack the resources to keep pace with shifts in the global 
economy (Friedman 1999). He further categorizes globalization’s “losers” in 
distinguishing two groups he refers to as “Turtles” and “Used-to-Be’s”; the former is 
composed of the world’s poorest in developing countries, while the latter are formerly 
economically stable, downwardly-mobile individuals with the means for political 
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organization (Friedman 1999). Joseph Stiglitz discusses the same phenomenon on a 
global scale by stressing the role of economic liberalization as managed by global 
financial institutions in deepening inequality between developed and developing 
countries (Stiglitz 2001). 
Popular debate on globalization, however, does not always acknowledge the 
variable effects of globalization, and instead reduces a complex phenomenon to a 
single outcome that is either “positive” or “negative” with respect to economic 
prosperity. This linear explanation of globalization is not theoretically sound and is 
unhelpful in understanding the impact of globalization in the United States. This line 
of popular reasoning is depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Goes Here 
 In the United States, many of the predominant narratives on the impact 
of globalization on the US economy are consistent with this flawed line of reasoning. 
Many who subscribe to the belief of uniformly negative outcomes emphasize 
widespread job loss and labor outsourcing, as well as the decline of traditional blue-
collar industry as a result of increased foreign competition, among other economic and 
social ills. Those favoring positive outcomes of globalization cite job growth in skilled 
field such as Informational Technology (IT) or the United States capacity to attract 
foreign talent that enhances our innovative capacity. Such arguments, however, are 
theoretically flawed.  
The theoretical problem arising from the assertion that globalization produces 
uniformly positive or negative effects is twofold. First, “positive” or “negative” 
arguments are value judgements that cannot be tested with empirical evidence.  
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Second, it is not logical that a complex and multidimensional phenomenon would 
produce a uniformly “positive” or “negative” outcome without some form of 
mediating influence, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Goes Here 
The inclusion of a mediating factor improves theoretical foundation for 
understanding the effects of globalization. However, it still neglects to identify the 
factors that mediate the impact of globalization in a nuanced way beyond the unhelpful 
binary view of “positive” and “negative.”  My theory thus reframes and improves 
upon this binary view, by arguing that the impact of globalization is mediated by 
contextual factors and results in different outcomes depending upon these factors. 
More specifically, I propose that the impact of globalization is mediated by economic 
context. 
In the case of the United States, specifically, a better way to test the 
purportedly uniform effects of globalization is to examine its impact in relation to the 
differing economic contexts of individual American states. I focus on four states: 
Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.  I expect that the different economic contexts of 
each of these states will mediate the impact of globalization. This theoretical 
proposition is depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 Goes Here 
As a preliminary indication of my theoretical argument, my analysis will show 
that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a measure of globalization supports 20.87% of 
Colorado’s manufacturing sector employment.  By contrast, FDI supports 60.04% of 
Ohio’s manufacturing sector employment supported by FDI.  This marked disparity is 
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attributable to the fact that, unlike Colorado, Ohio has historically possessed a robust 
manufacturing sector in America’s industrial heartland.    
The next section discusses the data and methodology used to gauge the impact 
of globalization on the four states used in my analysis. 
III. Data and Methodology 
While there are many ways to conceptualize and examine the processes of 
globalization, this thesis focuses on the economic dimension of globalization.  
Specifically, it examines the impact of economic globalization on individual American 
states through sectoral analysis of employment in select industries across four states: 
Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.  It uses Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a 
measure of economic globalization.  Foreign Direct Investment is a simple and 
practical indicator of globalization because it represents the degree of international 
involvement in supporting the respective workforces and economic sectors of each of 
the four states.  The thesis uses the structure of the workforce in economic sectors to 
measure employment in each of the four states.  The impact of FDI on employment in 
different economic sectors is a particularly useful way to measure the impact of 
globalization for two reasons.  First, it illustrates the composition of the job market 
and the relative importance of each sector for a state’s economy.  Second, it highlights 
the potential for workers to earn a living, which carries greater implications for 
Americans’ economic security and wellbeing.   Foreign Direct Investment and 




All data pertaining to economic sectors are drawn from and organized according to 
the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS).  The NAICS is used 
for data collection across all federal bodies collecting employment statistics, making it 
the ideal for organizing the data for the thesis. The NAICS categorizes sectors and 
subsectors at multiple levels of aggregation; I limit my analysis to the highest level of 
aggregation in order to locate uniformly measured figures for both domestic 
employment and FDI-supported employment, as detailed sector data was not available. 
The eight sectors included in the analysis were identified as the largest recipients of 
FDI in the states examined. Thus, the scope of my analysis includes the following 
sectors: Finance and Insurance; Information; Professional and Scientific Services; Real 
Estate; Retail; Manufacturing; and Wholesale Trade. I also include an “Other” 
category, which encompasses all of the remaining nonagricultural NAICS sectors.  
The source for the sector-specific employment data is the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics Program (OES). The OES publishes 
annual research estimate reports organized by NAICS sector. All domestic data were 
located within the OES research estimate archives. The source for the FDI-supported 
employment data is SelectUSA, a division of the United States Department of 
Commerce that promotes inward FDI flow.  Using their Investment Data Tool, I 
located FDI employment data for each state and sector. Because OES Research 
Estimates are not available prior to the year 2012, and SelectUSA FDI data are not yet 
available for 2016 through 2018, I limit the scope of my analysis to the year 2015.  
While more recent data are available with respect to domestic employment, limiting 
my analysis to the year 2015 enables me to avoid the gaps in the FDI data and conduct 
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uniform comparisons of domestic and FDI-supported employment data. Employment 
data for the year 2015 retains sufficient predictive power as the general trends 
observed within that time period have continued into future years. The total number of 
employees in each state’s workforce was located using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Economy at a Glance data tool. 
The data used in this analysis begins with a sectoral breakdown of domestic 
employment in seven major industries for Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. This 
includes the number and percentage of employees in each sector.  I then present the 
percentage of each state’s total workforce attributable to FDI.  Finally, I present the 
number of FDI-supported employees and percentage of each sector’s workforce 
supported by FDI in relation to total employment in each sector.  The next section 
presents the data analysis. 
IV. Data Analysis 
Appendix 1 at the end of the document presents the full dataset for the analysis 
presented in this thesis. Table 1 reports data on the workforce profile of each of the 
four states examined in this thesis: Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.  It provides a 
baseline mapping of the total workforce and its breakdown by relevant economic 
sectors.  The data show the number of employees in a given economic sector and the 
percentage of the state’s total workforce represented by that sector.  Because the 
baseline employment data is sourced from the BLS Occupational Employment 
Statistics Program, which encompasses all NAICS sectors, those represented in the 
table are identical to those highlighted by SelectUSA for attracting the largest share of 
foreign direct investment.  The total and sectoral composition of the workforce in 
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Table 1 thus allows for optimal comparability between total employment figures and 
FDI-supported employment figures. 
Table 1 Goes Here 
Immediately apparent in the sectoral breakdown of the workforce is that the 
vast majority of each state’s employment is represented within the “Other” category, 
which houses an average of 64.27% of the states’ labor force. This category 
encompasses the remaining nonagricultural NAICS sectors not identified by 
SelectUSA as significant recipients of FDI.  For this reason, they are not the focus of 
this analysis. 
In Colorado, the Profession, Scientific, and Technical Services sector, which 
employs 7.74% of the state’s workforce, trails the Retail sector, which employs 9.68% 
of the state’s workforce.  However,  Professional and Services sector is also the sector 
with a high concentration of workers in what are generally considered knowledge-
based jobs; when combined with the share of the state’s workforce in the knowledge-
based Finance and Insurance sectors (3.86%) and the knowledge-based journalism, 
broadcasting and telecommunications-based Information sector (2.56%), the overall 
share of the Colorado’s workforce in the post-modern technological and information 
based sectors of the state’s economy is 13.86%.  Comparison with the other states 
shows that Colorado’s 13.86% share of the workforce in the knowledge-based sectors 
exceed those of Georgia (11.84%), Ohio (9.84%), and Texas (9.84%) in the 
corresponding knowledge-based sectors. 
In Ohio, the largest share of the state’s workforce is in manufacturing at 
12.68%, attesting to Ohio’s position as a historical manufacturing hub in America’s 
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industrial heartland. Notably, Ohio also has the lowest employment share in 
knowledge-based sectors (9.84%) of the four states, as noted above.  While the Retail 
sector attracts the largest share of the workforce in both Georgia (10.70%) and 
(10.37%), the manufacturing sector in both states attracts the second largest share of 
the workforce at 8.33% and 7.15%, respectively.  However, this is not comparable to 
the historical economic significance of the manufacturing sector in Ohio. Instead, the 
emergence of the manufacturing sectors in Georgia and Texas are attributable to more 
recent economic shifts associated with globalization, as I will elaborate upon below. 
As summary indicators of economic structure, these data show notable 
differences in the economic composition between the four states. If my theoretical 
proposition that the impact of FDI is mediated by these economic differences is valid, 
then the impact of inward foreign direct investment should have varied impacts on 
employment in these sectors across the four states.  I will now discuss the contribution 
of FDI to the total workforce of each of the four states.  Figure 4 displays the data for 
this discussion. 
Figure 4 Goes Here 
Figure 4 illustrates the extent to which FDI-supported employment contributes 
to each state’s total workforce.  In Colorado, FDI contributes 103,000 jobs (3.79%) to 
the total workforce of 2,715,76.  In Georgia, FDI-supported employment is slightly 
greater, with 222,220 jobs for its workforce of approximately 4,504,229 (5%).  In 
Texas, FDI-supported employment is roughly comparable to Georgia’s at 4.61%, with 
586,000 FDI-sourced jobs out of a total of workforce of 12,496,106.  Finally, Ohio 
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with 526,600 FDI-supported jobs in its workforce of 5,416,220 has the largest share of 
FDI-supported employment at 9.72% of total employment. 
A cursory examination of these figures might suggest that, in contributing a 
relatively small percentage to each of the four states’ total workforce, FDI-supported 
employment is of little consequence in producing the hypothesized varied economic 
globalization outcomes. However, a closer look at the FDI contribution to state 
employment by economic sectors indicates more complex and nuanced results due to 
the varied economic contexts of each state.  
The data in Table 2 help to illustrate this mediating role of varied economic 
contexts on the contribution of FDI to employment in the four states.  I will provide an 
aggregate overview of the contribution of FDI to employment in individual economic 
sectors in Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. I will then discuss in greater detail the 
contribution of FDI to the respective manufacturing sectors of these four states. While 
the significance of other sectors is not to be understated, both the theoretical literature 
and recent quantitative research suggest that the long-term vitality of manufacturing 
sector is of great consequence to the overall economic health of the United States 
(Muro et al. 2015). Moreover, the manufacturing sector is directly enmeshed with the 
core impending challenges facing the United States as a direct result of globalization, 
such as increasing skill requirements that displace traditional blue-collar laborers, 
increased international competition in historically prosperous industries, and 
accelerating rural-urban migration. 
Table 2 Goes Here 
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A close examination of the data in Table 2 reveals meaningful variations 
among sectors and among the four states. Comprised of sectors identified by 
SelectUSA as having the largest concentration of FDI-supported employment, the data 
show the number of employees in FDI-supported jobs in a given sector, the percentage 
of each sector’s total employment attributable to FDI-supported jobs, and the 
combined total of domestic and FDI-supported employees in each sector for the four 
states examined.  
Overall, the substantial impact of FDI-supported employment in the 
manufacturing sector cannot be overstated in assessing globalization outcomes. Of the 
four states examined, it is the only sector that appears within the top two sectors by 
percentage of FDI employment (see Table 2).   Notably, it is also the sector with the 
most FDI employment by percentage in all four states, with margins between 
manufacturing and the next highest sector by FDI employment as high as 8.9% in 
Colorado and 51.68% in Ohio. 
Perhaps the most notable insight these data provide is the stark contrast 
between the significance of the FDI contribution to a given sector in a state’s 
workforce and the perceived significance of FDI-supported employment when looking 
at the total percentage of FDI contribution to a state’s total workforce; this 
phenomenon is most prominently represented in the case of manufacturing. For 
example, while only 3.79% of Colorado’s total workforce is attributable to FDI-
supported employment, (See Figure 4) more than 20% of Colorado’s manufacturing 
sector employees are FDI-supported (See Table 2).  Colorado, historically, has not had 
a robust manufacturing sector; that more than one-fifth of employment in its 
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manufacturing sector is attributable to FDI speaks to the scholarly consensus that 
globalization will have a substantial impact on the United States labor force through 
economic restructuring (Friedman 1999; Stiglitz 2017). Colorado exemplifies this 
phenomenon in that a sector of relatively small historical significance to the state 
economy now manifests a significant economic footprint in the state economy through 
FDI. 
The economic activity of nascent industries occurring in Colorado is also 
visible in other states. The FDI-supported faction of the manufacturing sectors in 
Georgia and Texas are near-identical to that of Colorado, consisting of 20.85% and 
20.23% FDI-supported employees, respectively. Like Colorado, these figures 
represent a fundamental change in economic structure, where “new economies” have 
developed with significant support from FDI.  
By comparison, Ohio has a markedly-higher share of FDI-supported 
employment in manufacturing than Colorado, Georgia, and Texas. With 412,300 FDI-
supported jobs in its manufacturing sector of 686,600 workers, over 60% of the state’s 
manufacturing jobs are FDI-supported. This amounts to 7.61% of Ohio’s total labor 
force being supported by FDI, compared to only 1.06% in Colorado, 1.74% in 
Georgia, and 1.45% in Texas. What differentiates Ohio from the other states examined 
is its historically strong manufacturing sector; the total percentage of the labor force in 
its manufacturing section as displayed in Table 1 reflects its greater significance to the 
state economy, overall. The greater contribution of FDI to manufacturing employment 
compared to that of Colorado, Georgia, and Texas can thus be attributed to differences 
in economic context.  More specifically, the share of employment in manufacturing 
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attributable to FDI reflects the historical size and significance of the manufacturing 
sector in Ohio, thereby illustrating my central theoretical claim that the impact of 
globalization is mediated by economic context. In this case, the same process of 
globalization, measured by inward foreign direct investment, has produced vastly 
different contributions to employment because of the different economic contexts of 
the four states.  
The central lesson to be drawn from the systematic data analysis presented in 
this section is that the differences in FDI employment contribution to the four states’ 
economic structure produce correspondingly varied outcomes for different segments of 
the American population, resulting in the marked economic differences and sharp 
political divisions across multiple fronts.  I elaborate on these larger social, economic 
and political implications of my data analysis in the next section. 
V. Implications 
As the data analysis in the previous section shows, while the FDI contribution 
to a state’s total economy may appear to be small, the FDI contribution to employment 
in individual sectors is far from inconsequential. This impact is especially evident in 
the manufacturing sector, where over 20% of employees are supported by FDI in all 
four of the states examined.  As a representative indicator of the larger phenomenon of 
shifting economic composition, the implications of FDI-supported employment in 
manufacturing are far-reaching.   Specifically, the varied impact of FDI on the 
manufacturing sector linked to economic differences among American states help 
explain the current economic and political discontent in the United States.  This 
contingent effect further supports my theoretical proposition that, rather than 
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producing uniformly “positive” or “negative” outcomes, the impact of globalization is 
moderated by the specific economic contexts of American states.  
At the epicenter of the events triggered by the interplay between the forces of 
globalization and the American manufacturing sector is the election of President 
Donald Trump in 2016.  While socially-fashionable explanations for the election 
results centers upon the importance of racism and xenophobia in the public sphere, 
there is an underlying, less often explored economic explanation that begins with 
fundamental change in traditionally blue-collar industries such as manufacturing.  
Historically, the manufacturing sector has existed at the heart of American 
economic prosperity and growth, with manufacturing jobs supporting a robust middle 
class. Presently, it remains a vitally important source of employment for “unskilled” 
workers without a bachelor’s degree (Scott 2015). However, increased foreign 
competition and the advancement of technology has changed the nature of American 
manufacturing, gradually driving the jobs of the same less-educated workers into 
obsolescence. As one report notes, “globalization and technological change are 
increasing the education requirements of the sector, sharpening its skills challenge” 
and making it increasingly difficult for employers to find qualified workers (Muro et 
al. 2015; Muro, Kulkarni, and Hart 2016). In effect, these changes have produced a 
growing class of Americans referred to by Friedman as “Used-to-Be’s,” who have 
been ousted from their secure middle-class existence and forced to watch their social 
safety net shrink away (Friedman 1999). This dwindling economic security of 
America’s “Used-to-“Be’s” continues to advance as the United States transitions to a 
“knowledge economy” that favors white collar professions and college-educated 
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workers, creating a fundamental tension between the “winners and losers”  of 
globalization along class lines.  
These globalization-induced structural economic changes also account for the 
political conflict between globalization’s “winners and losers.” One such example is 
the political cleavage between what has been dubbed “high output America” and “low 
output America” (Muro and Liu 2016; Tankersley 2016). According to the article, 
“two different economic nations within America” are characterized by fundamental 
differences in voting behavior. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, he observed that 
the less than 500 Clinton-majority counties altogether encompassed 64% of economic 
activity as measured by output, while the more than 2,600 Trump-majority counties 
encompassed on 36% of economic activity. This same trend was echoed in the 2018 
midterm elections, where Muro noted that the governing majority won by Democrats 
encompassed more than 60% of America’s economic activity, while the Republican 
seats accounted for less than 40% of economic activity. Further, he observed that seats 
won by Democrats represented a disproportionately greater share of Americans with a 
bachelor’s degree or greater working in “knowledge professions” such as software 
publishing and computer systems design, while Republican seats were backed by a 
workforce dominated by non-advanced, low-output manufacturing subsectors (Muro 
and Whiton 2018). These observations serve to represent the empirical reality 
explained by the theoretical premise that globalization produces a variety of outcomes 
depending upon economic context.  
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This particular divide between “America’s two economies” poses a salient 
challenge for legislators, as these two groups have inherently conflicting policy 
interests: 
“…a rurally oriented Senate majority representing ‘traditional’ 
agricultural, energy, and production economies stands ready to block efforts to 
address the needs of an urban and suburban ‘knowledge’ economy. That latter 
economy is more oriented to future-leaning digital services, and thus depends 
on solutions to major issues like R&D funding, worker reskilling for a digital 
age, immigration, health care, income inequality, and international 
cooperation” (Muro and Whiton 2018). 
The central concern arising from this conflict, according to Muro, is that it 
affords non-urban Republicans disproportionate power to enact policy that “fails to 
meet the needs of the core, high-value economic sector of the country (Muro and 
Whiton 2018). This observation, noteworthy by itself, carries an underlying 
implication that America’s most important economic activity is concentrated in the 
same sort of Clinton-majority, urban areas saturated with knowledge-based 
professions. Concurrently, however, it is still widely-reported that manufacturing is the 
largest and most important sector in the American economy by many metrics, 
including employment and total share of GDP (Scott 2015). This raises the question as 
to how a purportedly-decaying manufacturing , sector can simultaneously be 
considered of vital importance to the country’s economic prosperity (Scott 2015). The 
nexus between these two realities emerges from yet another consequence of 
globalization, namely, the development of advanced industry (AI).  
Smoske 17 
 
Within the manufacturing sector, there is a widening gap between the low-
output manufacturing subindustries implicated in Muro and Tankersley’s analyses – 
such as paper, apparel, and food – and high output “advanced” manufacturing, 
including products like chemicals, computer equipment, and motor vehicle parts. What 
separates these subindustries, according to a Brookings report, is that the latter 
“invest[s] heavily in technology innovation and employ[s] skilled workers to develop, 
diffuse, and apply new productivity-enhancing technologies” (Muro et al. 2015). 
Those employed in advanced manufacturing earn, on average, more than those in 
traditional low-output manufacturing; this is notable in that more than half of all 
advanced industry employees possess less than a bachelor’s degree, making it a 
significant employer of the same demographic groups who can no longer retain 
economic stability in traditional, labor-intensive commodity manufacturing (Muro et 
al. 2015; Scott 2015).  
Many of these trends pertaining to the relative success of advanced 
manufacturing can be attributed to FDI. As previously discussed, the lion’s share of 
FDI is spent on the manufacturing sector, accounting for an average of 39% of total 
FDI between 1997 and 2010 (Payne and Yu 2011). Moreover, the majority of FDI-
supported employment in manufacturing falls into advanced industry subsectors. In 
2017, for example, the chemical industry received 44% of the total FDI directed at 
manufacturing (Book 2018). One report from the US Department of Commerce that in 
addition to providing consistently higher compensation than positions in U.S. firms, 
FDI-supported employment has proven more stable than domestic-supported 
employment (Payne and Yu 2011). Specifically, while total manufacturing 
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employment fell 24% between 1998 and 2008, FDI-supported manufacturing 
employment only fell by 11% (Payne and Yu 2011). These figures are attractive on the 
surface. In theory, this might suggest that advanced manufacturing could be 
globalization’s “answer” to the financially-struggling workers displaced by eroding 
blue-collar industries. The reality, however, is that advanced industry, including FDI-
supported employment, is in many ways deepening existing the political and economic 
divisions brought by globalization.  
Beyond its superficial promise of recovery for displaced former manufacturing 
workers, several developments within the advanced industries have worsened their 
circumstances.  First, technology is widening the gap between employment and 
productivity as robotics have increasingly rendered human involvement in 
manufacturing obsolete (Muro 2016b; Stiglitz 2017). This is evidenced by the fact that 
while total manufacturing output in the United States is at an all-time high, total 
employment has plummeted in both traditional and advanced manufacturing (Scott 
2015). Logically, the continuation of this trend does not bode well for the employment 
prospects of the advanced industries’ unskilled faction, who risk joining the ranks of 
“Used-to-Be’s” in the future. Second, the geographic clustering of AI jobs limits 
economic opportunities for the most vulnerable to job loss. While conventional 
wisdom on labor-market adjustment suggests that dislocated workers would simply 
migrate to more economically-healthy areas to find new jobs, as they have historically 
done during periods of recession, this no longer appears to be the case; instead, the 
majority of dislocated workers default to nonparticipation in the labor force altogether 
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(Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016; Muro 2016a). This apparent inability to relocate 
makes the uneven geography of gainful employment especially problematic.  
At the root of globalization’s many tensions, including urban and rural; blue 
and white collar; or high and low-output, is the shifting geography of opportunity with 
respect to rural-urban migration and regional industrial specialization. Census reports 
indicate that between 2000 and 2010, America’s urban population has increased by 
12.1%, a rate that exceeds the overall national growth rate of 9.7% for the same period 
(“Growth in Urban Population,” 2012). This phenomenon is reflected in the geography 
of employment growth, which is becoming increasingly concentrated within 
metropolitan areas (Hertz 2017).  The FDI-induced geographic disparity is 
compounded by the fact that the rural areas are experiencing zero or negative 
population growth due to rural-urban migration, while the country’s overall declining 
workforce participation due to its aging population amount to a locally-shrinking labor 
force. The corresponding movement of jobs from rural to urban areas produces 
disparate economic circumstances for less skilled or unskilled workers. One study 
notes: 
“Rural areas have larger concentrations of Machinists and Makers, 
which generally require less skill and receive lower salaries. Jobs with the 
highest skill requirements -- engineers, executives, scientists, and analysts -- 
were noticeably underrepresented in rural areas and were far below national 
averages” (Abel, Gabe, and Stolarick 2014.). 
The “machinist” and “maker” categories encompass mostly the traditional 
labor-intensive commodity manufacturing that is experiencing an overall decline in 
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employment. In rural communities, these workers not only make less than the 
“knowledge” workers of urban areas, but also less than their urban counterparts 
employed in manufacturing subindustries (Abel, Gabe, and Stolarick 2014). In short, 
the predominant impact of rural-urban migration is to dive away existing jobs and halt 
job creation in rural communities in favor of urban areas, creating a deeper economic 
divide between rural and urban Americans. 
Though a faction of unskilled workers successfully acquire comparatively 
higher-paying jobs in urban areas, their long-term economic stability is also vulnerable 
due to increasing regional industrial specialization. As many researchers have 
observed, many industries have a tendency to cluster geographically, because 
industrial organization around resources, whether they be access to raw materials, 
skilled workers, or local knowledge flows, optimizes the industry’s capacity for 
innovation (Muro et al. 2015; Scott 2015; Feldman and Florida 1994). Advanced 
manufacturing is no exception, as the United States has developed “a distinct advanced 
industry geography” job growth occurs along lines of regional specialization (Muro et 
al. 2015). In any region, increasing specialization is inherently limiting the range of 
economic opportunity available to workers. While this phenomenon can certainly 
impact the job-market prospects for skilled workers, it is especially economically-
destabilizing for unskilled workers who possess lesser means to relocate and a more 
prohibitively-narrow skillset (Feldman and Florida 1994). Overall, an economic 
landscape where many industries are not national, but local, economic outcomes for 
different factions of the American population will greatly differ depending on the 
industrial composition of their respective local economies. Over time, as the 
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geography of opportunity has become increasingly favorable to the educated elite at 
the expense of America’s “Used-to-Be’s,” deepening class stratification aggravates 
political tensions between globalization’s “winners” and “losers.” 
The forces of globalization in America have produced variable outcomes for 
different factions of the population depending upon economic context. These 
outcomes can be conceptualized as tensions that have surfaced in the American 
political landscape: between urban and rural populations; blue and white collar 
professions; or high and low-output counties, and others. The state of American 
manufacturing is a particularly helpful example that can be used to explain the nature 
and origin of these divisions. The aggregate impact of these divisions is the recent 
proliferation of anti-globalization sentiment, or “alter-globalization” (Eriksen 2014). 
This backlash against globalization, born from the anger of the recently economically-
disenfranchised, serves to explain why a populist leader like Trump proved an 
attractive candidate and what Stiglitz calls “new protectionism” an appealing 
redirection for American policy (Stiglitz 2017; Rodrik 2017). More broadly, these 
varied outcomes explain the attitudes underlying an increasingly-polarized political 
landscape. As Friedman notes, quite prophetically, in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 
“Used-to-Be’s are distinct from any other group spurned by globalization because they 
possess the political clout to organize (Friedman 1999). This is precisely what is 
occurring among those who have been ousted from a comfortable middle-class 
lifestyle when their jobs became obsolete or moved elsewhere.  As Stiglitz notes the 
“newly-discontented” middle and working class people marginalized by globalization 




In the United States, the popular debate often describes globalization as 
yielding uniformly positive or negative effects. This line of reasoning is employed 
particularly in discussion about globalization-induced shifts in the US labor market 
and its implications on Americans’ economic prosperity. However, this conception of 
globalization is not theoretically sound, as it lends itself to overly simplified 
explanations for the current social, political, and economic divisions in the United 
States. My analysis suggests, in contrast, that that the impact of globalization is 
mediated by different economic contexts of American states. By examining the impact 
of inward foreign direct investment on employment in Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and 
Texas , I demonstrate that the different economic contexts of each states mediates the 
varied results globalization discernible in them. 
My findings facilitate improved and more nuanced understanding of the deep 
social, political, and economic divisions in the United States today. Because of 
globalization, the American economy is becoming increasingly polarized, defined by 
tensions between the “newly-discontented” – those economically displaced by the 
decline of traditional blue-collar industry – and the educated, white-collar Americans 
working in knowledge professions. This polarization is deepened by accelerating rural-
urban migration, which creates a higher concentration of jobs in metropolitan areas 
and widens the gap between “low-output” and “high-output America” (Muro 2016). 
For unskilled workers in urban areas, employment is nonetheless becoming 
increasingly inaccessible as the skills requirements for jobs are outpacing education 
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and the technological strides in “advanced industry” drive unskilled workers in 
obsolescence. These deep divisions were reflected in Donald Trump’s victory in 2016. 
Finally, this thesis has not addressed other important topics related to 
globalization, such as trade, capital flows, banking and finance, cyber technology, the 
growth of knowledge-based productions hubs in different parts of the world, among 
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Table 1. State Workforce by Economic Sectors in Colorado, Georgia, Ohio and 
Texas 
 










Finance and Insurance 104,700 3.86  162,090 3.60 
Information 69,390 2.56  111,840 2.48 
Other 1,803,147 66.40  2,857,449 63.44 
Professional/Scientific 202,090 7.44  259,320 5.76 
Real Estate 33,070 1.22  42,890 0.95 
Retail 262,810 9.68  482,150 10.70 
Total Manufacturing 138,960 5.12  375,030 8.33 
Wholesale Trade 101,600 3.74  213,460 4.74 
Totals 2,715,767 100.00  4,504,229 100.00 
 










Finance and Insurance 212,060 3.92  493,170 3.95 
Information 71,770 1.33  199,970 1.60 
Other 3,338,030 61.63  8,198,366 65.61 
Professional/Scientific 248,500 4.59  704,970 5.64 
Real Estate 42,950 0.79  135,010 1.08 
Retail 580,390 10.72  1,295,380 10.37 
Total Manufacturing 686,660 12.68  893,540 7.15 
Wholesale Trade 235,860 4.35  575,700 4.61 
Totals 5,416,220 100.00  12,496,106 100.00 





Table 2. FDI Contribution to Employment by Economic Sectors in Colorado, 
Georgia, Ohio, and Texas 
 














Finance and Insurance 104,700 7,800 7.45  162,090 6,500 4.01 
Information 69,390 8,800 12.68  111,840 9,800 8.76 
Other 1,803,147 34,800 1.93  2,857,449 64,500 2.26 
Professional/Scientific 202,090 7,500 3.71  259,320 11,600 4.47 
Real Estate 33,070 300 0.91  42,890 3,000 6.99 
Retail 262,810 5,300 2.02  482,150 9,500 1.97 
Total Manufacturing 138,960 29,000 20.87  375,030 78,200 20.85 
Wholesale Trade 101,600 9,500 9.35  213,460 39,100 18.32 
Totals 2,715,767 103,000 3.79  4,504,229 222,200 4.93 
   















Finance and Insurance 212,060 5,100 2.40  493,170 26,200 5.31 
Information 71,770 6,000 8.36  199,970 25,900 12.95 
Other 3,338,030 57,500 1.72  8,198,366 212,300 2.59 
Professional/Scientific 248,500 11,400 4.59  704,970 46,600 6.61 
Real Estate 42,950 700 1.63  135,010 6,300 4.67 
Retail 580,390 17,900 3.08  1,295,380 28,400 2.19 
Total Manufacturing 686,660 412,300 60.04  893,540 180,800 20.23 
Wholesale Trade 235,860 15,700 6.66  575,700 59,600 10.35 
Totals 5,416,220 526,600 9.72  12,496,106 586,100 64.91 
Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.
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Finance and Insurance 104,700 3.86 7,800 7.45 
Information 69,390 2.56 8,800 12.68 
Other 1,803,147 66.40 34,800 1.93 
Professional/Scientific 202,090 7.44 7,500 3.71 
Real Estate 33,070 1.22 300 0.91 
Retail 262,810 9.68 5,300 2.02 
Total Manufacturing 138,960 5.12 29,000 20.87 
Wholesale Trade 101,600 3.74 9,500 9.35 
Totals 2,715,767 100.00 103,000 3.79 
















Finance and Insurance 162,090 3.60 6,500 4.01 
Information 111,840 2.48 9,800 8.76 
Other 2,857,449 63.44 64,500 2.26 
Professional/Scientific 259,320 5.76 11,600 4.47 
Real Estate 42,890 0.95 3,000 6.99 
Retail 482,150 10.70 9,500 1.97 
Total Manufacturing 375,030 8.33 78,200 20.85 
Wholesale Trade 213,460 4.74 39,100 18.32 
Totals 4,504,229 100.00 222,200 4.93 















Finance and Insurance 212,060 3.92 5,100 2.40 
Information 71,770 1.33 6,000 8.36 
Other 3,338,030 61.63 57,500 1.72 
Professional/Scientific 248,500 4.59 11,400 4.59 
Real Estate 42,950 0.79 700 1.63 
Retail 580,390 10.72 17,900 3.08 
Total Manufacturing 686,660 12.68 412,300 60.04 
Wholesale Trade 235,860 4.35 15,700 6.66 
Totals 5,416,220 100.00 526,600 9.72 


















Finance and Insurance 493,170 3.95 26,200 5.31 
Information 199,970 1.60 25,900 12.95 
Other 8,198,366 65.61 212,300 2.59 
Professional/Scientific 704,970 5.64 46,600 6.61 
Real Estate 135,010 1.08 6,300 4.67 
Retail 1,295,380 10.37 28,400 2.19 
Total Manufacturing 893,540 7.15 180,800 20.23 
Wholesale Trade 575,700 4.61 59,600 10.35 
Totals 12,496,106 100.00 586,100 64.91 
Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text. 
